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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3379
___________
HELENE KARPIEL,
               Appellant
   v.
OGG, CORDES, MURPHY & IGNELZI,
LLP, The Firm; GARY J. OGG, Esq.;
SAMUEL J. CORDES, Esq.;
MICHAEL A. MURPHY, Esq.; PHILIP A. IGNELZI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-00523)
District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 6, 2008
Before: MCKEE, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed October 28, 2008)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
2Helene Karpiel, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s entry of
summary judgment in favor of Appellees.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the
judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings.
On April 2, 2004, Karpiel initiated the underlying lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  In short order, Karpiel filed a
complaint, an amended complaint, a second amended complaint, and a document entitled
“amended complaint with some attachments added.”  Appellees moved to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  The
District Court denied their motion, holding that Karpiel had sufficiently pled that
Appellees had refused to allow her to roll over, transfer or withdraw her funds held in
their 401k plan and, therefore, had stated a claim for enforcement under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
As explained by the District Court, there then ensued a protracted period of
discovery during which Karpiel had to be ordered to attend her deposition.
Approximately two years after the District Court denied Appellees’ motion to dismiss,
they moved for summary judgment, arguing that Karpiel failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies under their employee benefit plan (“the Plan”).  The Court
permitted Karpiel until July 5, 2007 to file a response, but she did not do so.  On July 9,
2007, the District Court entered an opinion and order granting Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment based on Appellees’ assertion that Karpiel failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies, and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what
3appears to be a state law unlawful termination claim.  Karpiel timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s entry of summary judgment, viewing the underlying facts and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
summary judgment motion.  Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 235 (3d
Cir. 1995).  We have held that “it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of
a moving party who bears the burden of proof at trial unless a reasonable juror would be
compelled to find its way on the facts needed to rule in its favor on the law.”  See El v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007).
ERISA itself does not contain an exhaustion requirement, but it does require
covered benefit plans to provide administrative remedies for persons whose claims for
benefits have been denied.  See  29 U.S.C. § 1133; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Price, 501 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing the ERISA exhaustion requirement as
“a judicial innovation with an eye toward ‘sound policy’”).  Accordingly, courts have
long held that an ERISA plan participant must exhaust the administrative remedies
available under the plan before seeking relief in federal court unless the participant can
demonstrate that resort to the plan remedies would be futile.  See Harrow v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 244, 249-51 (3d Cir. 2002); Weldon v. Kraft, 896 F.2d 793,
800 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Exhaustion is an affirmative defense and, accordingly, the burden is on Appellees
to demonstrate that Karpiel failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the plan. 
4See Price, 501 F.3d at 280 (exhaustion requirement in ERISA enforcement action is “a
nonjurisdictional affirmative defense”); Jakimas v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d
770, 782 (3d Cir. 2007) (summary judgment properly denied where moving party failed
to meet burden of proving affirmative defense).  In their summary judgment brief,
Appellees state that “there is no record evidence that Plaintiff took the appropriate steps
to exhaust her administrative remedies, as those remedies would have been defined in the
plan documents.”  (Ae. Br., at 2.)  Appellees seem to rely on 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4),
which provides:
The administrator shall, upon written request of any participant or
beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest updated summary plan description,
and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement,
trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is
established or operated. 
Appellees maintain that, because there is no evidence in the record that Karpiel submitted
a “written request” as required by this section, she failed to exhaust her remedies.  It is
not clear, and Appellees do not cite any support for the proposition, that this section
applies to a plan participant seeking to roll over, transfer or withdraw the funds held in
her 401k account, as Karpiel alleges she seeks to do here.  
Under our case law, the appropriate question is what remedies are required under
the plan.  See Harrow, 279 F.3d at 249.   Unfortunately, Appellees fail to provide the
Court with any information regarding the exhaustion requirements of the Plan, nor does
their bald assertion that Karpiel has failed to exhaust demonstrate that she has, in fact,
failed to exhaust.  See El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 479
5F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Because SEPTA sought summary judgment on its
affirmative defense of business necessity, it would bear the burden of proof at trial and
therefore must show that it has produced enough evidence to support the findings of fact
necessary to win.”).  While the District Court noted that Karpiel failed to come forth with
any evidence in response to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment indicating that she
attempted to pursue her remedies under the Plan prior to filing the instant lawsuit, the
burden only shifts to her to do so once Appellees, as the moving party, have “successfully
point[ed] to evidence of all of the facts needed to decide the case on the law short of
trial.”  Id. at 238.  In addition, we note that the record contains at least two documents
which call into question Appellees assertion.  (See Supp. Appx., at 103-104.)  Although
we cannot say with certainty that these letters satisfy the requirements of the Plan, as we
have not been apprised of what those requirements are, they do appear to be written
requests for distribution forms.
Because Appellees have not met their burden of demonstrating that Karpiel failed
to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Plan, we will vacate and remand the
judgment of the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
